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Comment
Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging
Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic
Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles
Anthony B. Sanders*
The report of my death was an exaggeration.
-Mark Twain1
For most people, caskets have very little to do with their
lives. Only in death do they encounter them. For Reverend Na-
thaniel Craigmiles, however, caskets are intimately connected
with his life, or rather, with his livelihood.! He and a fellow
minister run a casket supply store in Chattanooga, Tennessee.3
Soon after first opening the business, the state ordered them to
cease and desist operations because neither, as Tennessee law
required,4 was a licensed funeral director.5 The order put the
businessmen in a dire financial situation and denied them the
opportunity to work in their chosen occupation. Said Reverend
Craigmiles at that time, "We are almost on the verge of bank-
ruptcy."
6
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota; M.A. 2000, University
of Wisconsin-Madison; B.A. 1998, Hamline University. The Author would like
to thank his editors Jennifer Jacobs and Kelly Pierce for their rigorous assis-
tance, C-SPAN for bringing the words of Richard Epstein to him and sowing
the seeds of this Comment, and idealists everywhere for advocating, and be-
lieving in, the unpopular.
1. Note to London correspondent of the New York Journal (June 1,
1897), in JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 562 (17th ed.
2002).
2. Walter Williams, On the Side of the Little Guy?, DESERET NEWS, Oct.
18, 2000, at A17.
3. Id.
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-303(b) (2002).
5. Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 660 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd,
312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
6. Casket Retailers File Suit to Sell in Tennessee, THE COM. APPEAL
(Memphis), Sept. 18, 1999, at B3.
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Economic ruin is no longer in the Reverend's future, how-
ever, because of the doctrine of economic substantive due proc-
ess.7 Craigmiles sued the state, claiming that it had violated his
right to earn a living as protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.8 On December 6, 2002, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and unanimously struck down
the licensing law.9 Even though the state was only required to
provide a rational basis for its licensing law, the court ruled
that it failed to meet that standard.' ° The Sixth Circuit's ruling
is the first time since the New Deal that a federal appeals court
has found an occupational licensing law to violate a person's
right to earn a living."
This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit was correct in
protecting that right and that other courts should follow its
lead. Part I analyzes the Supreme Court's recent treatment of
economic substantive due process, as well as its treatment of
equal protection rational basis review. Part II outlines how
lower courts have recently begun giving greater consideration
to economic substantive due process claims. Part III analyzes
Craigmiles itself, focusing on the court's discussion of legiti-
mate governmental interests and its application of the Su-
preme Court's rational basis jurisprudence. Part IV argues that
the Sixth Circuit was justified in protecting Tennessee casket
retailers from state regulation. The regulations involved are so
onerous and transparently anticompetitive that they serve no
legitimate governmental purpose.12 Rather, they protect estab-
lished businesses from competition, a purpose that fails even
7. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that af-
ter the district court granted an injunction against the state funeral board, the
plaintiffs were able to resume business operations).
8. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
9. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
10. Id. at 228.
11. See Press Release, John Kramer & Lisa Knepper, Institute for Justice,
Sixth Circuit Decision Puts Another Nail in Coffin of State-Imposed Casket
Monopolies (Dec. 6, 2002), at http://www.ij.org/cases/index.html (calling
Craigmiles "the first federal appeals court victory for economic liberty since it
was gutted by the New Deal").
12. See infra notes 148-78 and accompanying text.
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the allowances of rational basis protection. 13 The Craigmiles
court recognized that to fail rational basis review, a law almost
always must not only lack a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental interest, but also must intentionally fur-
ther an illegitimate governmental interest. 14 In doing so, it cor-
rectly relied on the Supreme Court's rational basis doctrine in
the equal protection context." The Craigmiles court failed,
however, to fully pursue its analysis of the relevancy of Ten-
nessee's licensing regulations, missing a stronger argument for
the regulations' unconstitutionality.' 6 Even so, the court's opin-
ion signals that federal courts will become more active in pro-
tecting the economic liberties of upstart entrepreneurs from the
protectionist hand of occupational licensing.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND ECONOMIC
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The doctrine of economic substantive due process contends
that some economic laws and regulations violate individual
rights that are protected through the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 The laws and regulations
are not unconstitutional because they were improperly admin-
istered or enacted, but because they infringe on substantive in-
dividual liberties." Modern economic substantive due process
jurisprudence abruptly began in the 1930s. 9 In 1934, the Su-
preme Court started to reverse its previous active protection of
economic liberties in Nebbia v. New York." There the Court
upheld a milk-pricing law on the grounds that economic legisla-
tion need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmen-
tal interest.21 The Court cemented the new standard into law in
1937 with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.22 Previously during
the Lochner era,13 the Court had at times overturned economic
13. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 173-93 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due
Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 265, 270 (1987).
18. Id. at 271.
19. Id. at 281.
20. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
21. Id. at 537.
22. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (holding that a minimum wage law for
women did not violate due process).
23. The era takes its name from the famous case of Lochner v. New York.
[Vol 88:668
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legislation when it felt Congress (through the Fifth Amend-
ment) or state legislatures (through the Fourteenth) had ex-
ceeded the limits of their legitimate regulatory powers.24 The
Court often reviewed economic legislation through a means-
ends analysis, inquiring into whether the legislation furthered
an interest properly within the government's police power, or
whether the means used to further the interest would actually
do so directly.25 If a regulation did not sufficiently or appropri-
ately further a governmental interest, it was an unconstitu-
tional violation of economic liberty.2 6 Post-1937 jurisprudence
has pursued essentially the same process of inquiry, but with
much greater deference to the legislature.
27
A. MODERN RATIONAL BASIS JURISPRUDENCE
Some of the most revealing remarks on the Court's post-
1937 view of economic regulation and due process appeared in
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., decided in 1955.28
There, the Court considered an Oklahoma law that forbade
anyone other than an optometrist or ophthalmologist from fit-
ting lenses without a prescription.29 Admitting that the law
might have nothing to do with health and safety, the Court
stated that it could be a "needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases."30 Nevertheless, it opined that there might have
been legitimate reasons for the Oklahoma legislature to pass
the law, and proceeded to engage in a means-ends analysis of
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding that a law restricting the number of hours bakers
could work per week to sixty was unconstitutional), overruled in part by Day
Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
24. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609-15
(1936) (minimum wage law for women), overruled in part by Olsen v. Ne-
braska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 244-47 (1941); Adkins
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) (minimum wage law for women),
overruled by W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1,
26 (1915) (bar on employers forbidding union membership), overruled in part
by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
25. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 280.
26. See id. at n.88.
27. See id. at 284-85 (noting that the post-1937 Court has pursued tradi-
tional means-ends analysis in economic substantive due process cases, but
with much greater leniency).
28. 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955).
29. Id. at 485-86 ("In practical effect, [the law] means that no optician can
fit old glasses into new frames or supply a lens... without a prescription.").
30. Id. at 487.
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those reasons. 1 One possible reason behind the law was that
some patients' needs were so delicate that even if an optician
must only refit an old lens, the optician should be forced to read
32a prescription. Another potential reason was that the legisla-
ture might have wished to encourage eye examinations.33
Although written in the form of a means-ends analysis, the
Court's arguments were not couched as positions that the
Oklahoma legislature actually took.34 The Court spent no time
considering the real reasons for the law and cited no legislative
history. 5 The justifications addressed were reasons the legisla-
ture might have taken into consideration.36 Under this stan-
dard, a law requires no more than a conceivable and rational
justification to be constitutionalY.
The Court now holds to a distinction between "certain fun-
damental rights and liberty interests" 3 and other less protected
values, such as economic liberties.39 In the course of developing
substantive due process review for lesser values, the Court
could have taken two different approaches. It could have fol-
lowed the method suggested in Ferguson v. Skrupa and refused
to consider economic legislation as subject to substantive due
process analysis.4 ° Instead, the Court has followed the method
31. See id. at 487-88.
32. See id. at 487 ("[11n some cases the directions contained in the pre-
scription are essential, if the glasses are to be fitted so as to correct the par-
ticular defects of vision.").
33. Id.
34. Id. at 487-88.
35. See id. at 484-91.
36. See, e.g., id. at 487 ("The legislature might have concluded that the
frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to jus-
tify this regulation .... [and] the legislature might have concluded that [a
prescription] ... was needed often enough to require one in every case.").
37. See id. at 488 ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a ra-
tional way to correct it."); cf. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S.
Ct. 2156, 2160 (2003) (stating that "judicial review is 'at an end' once the court
identifies a plausible basis on which the legislature may have relied" (citing
United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980))).
38. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing as exam-
ples the right to marry and the right to have children, among others).
39. See id. at 728-35 (inquiring whether the right to terminate one's own
life is a protected liberty interest, and rejecting that claim); see also United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a bifur-
cation of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment into those where the
legislature is given deference and those which call for greater judicial scru-
tiny).
40. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (refusing to allow for
[Vol 88:668
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articulated in Williamson,4' leaving open the possibility of over-
turning economic legislation through rational basis review.2
Through this limited standard, the doctrine of economic sub-
stantive due process, at least nominally, lives on.43
The modern Court has recognized the need for a rational
basis justification of economic legislation on a number of occa-
sions. 44 In General Motors Corp. v. Romein, Justice O'Connor
succinctly stated the appropriate test when reviewing a retro-
active workers' compensation law: Economic legislation must
correspond to "a legitimate legislative purpose" and must be
"furthered by rational means."4 In applying this test, the Court
still adheres to a means-ends analysis of economic regulations,
inquiring whether an economic regulation could conceivably
further a legitimate governmental interest.46 It will not sum-
marily dismiss an economic substantive due process claim, con-
cluding that a piece of regulation is irrational but then ruling it
nonetheless constitutional.47 Instead, the Court generally takes
the possibility of overturning economic legislation through the Due Process
Clause).
41. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488.
42. See id. (stating the need for legislation to be a "rational way to correct"
"an evil at hand"); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191
(1992) (providing an explicit rational basis test); Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (remarking that price controls resting on an arbitrary
basis are unconstitutional under rational basis review); Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 476-77 (1985)
(subjecting federal railroad legislation to a rational basis requirement).
43. Admittedly, the Court has cited Ferguson favorably on a number of
occasions. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124 (1978).
Despite the occasional affirmation that the Supreme Court does not "sit as a
'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,"' id. (quoting Ferguson,
372 U.S. at 731), however, the Court still refuses to abandon the possibility of
economic substantive due process review. For skepticism on whether William-
son allowed for any effective due process challenges, see G. Sidney Buchanan,
A Very Rational Court, 30 HOuS. L. REV., 1509, 1520-21 (1993) (stating that
"the Court moved to a position approaching total abdication" of protecting eco-
nomic liberties).
44. See supra note 42.
45. Romein, 503 U.S. at 191 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)).
46. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 477-78 (discussing
the conceivably rational basis of national railway legislation).
47. See Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the
Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397, 400 (1993) ("[D]espite the occasional judi-
cial protestations of abstinence from the review of our government's economic
programs, a total judicial abstinence would not have been appropriate and
has, in fact, never been the rule."). The Court did implicitly allow for irrational
governmental interests in Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 732, but, again, that case was
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time to argue that regulations challenged under economic sub-
stantive due process actually are rational.48
B. EQUAL PROTECTION PARALLELS
The continuing existence of economic substantive due proc-
ess has paralleled equal protection jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court has held that in the absence of suspect categories or fun-
damental rights, legislation can treat groups differently as long
as "there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification."4 9 The standard of
rational basis review for equal protection and for substantive
due process is the same.5 ° The Court uses virtually identical
language to describe each test. For instance, in the due process
context, the Court has stated that laws violate substantive due
process if they are "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant,"" "arbitrary [or] irrational,""2 or do not advance a
"legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means." 3
an exception to the predominant rule. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
48. See, e.g., Romein, 503 U.S. at 191 (stating that the retroactive pension
legislation at issue was a rational way to balance pension payments in the face
of an unexpected state supreme court decision); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
470 U.S. at 477-78 (arguing that the alteration of railroad contracts, which
shifted costs to the railroads, was rational because the railroads received the
benefit of improved labor relations); N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's
Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1973) (quoting Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), which argued
that it was sensible to require a majority of pharmacy stock to be owned by
licensed pharmacists because "[tihe selling of drugs and poisons calls for
knowledge in a high degree").
One arguable exception is Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117
(1978), where Justice Blackmun summarily deferred to the wisdom of the leg-
islature. Id. at 124-25. In doing so, however, he referred to literature arguing
for the divestiture legislation in question. Id. at 124 n.13 (citing Comment,
Gasoline Marketing Practices and "Meeting Competition" Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, 37 MD. L. REV. 323, 329 n.44 (1977)).
49. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
50. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.4 (3d ed. 1999) ("Re-
gardless of whether a court is employing substantive due process or equal pro-
tection analysis, it should use the same standards of review."); Erwin Chemer-
insky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 73 (1989) (lumping
the two rational basis tests together for cases not involving fundamental
rights or suspect classifications).
51. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988).
52. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 477.
53. Romein, 503 U.S. at 191 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)).
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Similarly, it has said that laws violate equal protection if they
are "so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of le-
gitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legisla-
ture's actions were irrational"54 or do not advance a "legitimate
legislative purpose furthered by rational means."55 Further-
more, in Pennell, Chief Justice Rehnquist implied that the test
56for each is the same.
The Supreme Court sometimes finds that laws violate
equal protection even when subjected to the deferential test of
rational basis scrutiny. 7 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., for example, the Court found that a zoning regula-
tion violated equal protection even though the group in ques-
tion, the mentally retarded, was not a suspect class." There, a
city ordinance denied zoning permits to group homes for the re-
tarded while approving permits to various other develop-
ments. 9 The Court examined each reason the city put forward
54. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 14 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979)).
55. Romein, 503 U.S. at 191 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S.
at 730).
56. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 14 (stating the Court could "hardly conclude"
that the rent control ordinance under consideration violated equal protection
once the Court had determined that it did not violate due process).
57. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (invalidating a
state constitutional provision precluding any statutory state action to protect
homosexuals from discrimination); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106-09
(1989) (finding no rational basis for permitting only landowners to sit on plan-
ning board); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336,
343-46 (1989) (holding that a land taxation scheme violated equal protection
because it was not applied uniformly); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that
denied equal protection to the mentally retarded); Williams v. Vermont, 472
U.S. 14, 21-27 (1985) (holding that a car-tax credit given to state residents but
denied to nonresidents promoted no legitimate state purpose); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881-83 (1985) (holding that there was no legitimate
state purpose behind a higher tax on insurance companies incorporated out of
state); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60-62 (1982) (declaring that retrospec-
tive dividend distribution to Alaska residents was not rationally related to en-
couraging state residency); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 533-38 (1973) (rejecting the exclusion of non-family households from the
federal food stamp program); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140-42 (1972)
(rejecting the denial of debtor protections to indigent defendants).
58. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-50; see also Bd. of Tr. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (clarifying that in Cleburne the Court held that the men-
tally retarded are not a "quasi-suspect" class, and that the ordinance at issue
was subjected to "only the minimum 'rational-basis' review applicable to gen-
eral social and economic legislation").
59. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436-37.
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for denying a permit." Through a means-ends analysis, it
looked into what other types of businesses the ordinance in
question affected and what possible harm the group home
might pose to the public.61 For example, the city argued that it
should not grant the permit for the group home because it
would be located across the street from a junior high school.62
The Court responded by noting that "about 30 mentally re-
tarded students" already attended the school, and that the
group home would therefore not change the existing interaction
between the children and the mentally retarded.63 The Court
concluded that the legitimate governmental purposes advanced
by the city were not rationally related to the zoning ordinance
and that the real purpose behind it, animus toward a specific
group, was illegitimate." Similarly, in Romer v. Evans, where
the Court invalidated an amendment to the Colorado constitu-
tion, it concluded that the actual purpose behind the amend-
ment was animus toward homosexuals. 65
Many commentators contend that when the Court has in-
validated legislation under the name of rational basis scrutiny,
it has actually used some form of heightened scrutiny and ille-
gitimately labeled its approach "rational basis."66 A majority of
justices, critics argue, do not have the courage to recognize
groups such as homosexuals or the mentally retarded as "sus-
pect classes," but feel they should protect them even without
60. Id. at 447-50.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 449.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 450. But see id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the ordinance in question would
be valid under traditional rational basis review, and that the Court in fact ap-
plied heightened scrutiny).
65. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also Paul E. McGreal,
Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L.
REV. 209, 250 (1998) ("Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer weave a consistent
thread. In each case, the Court had some reason to suspect that the govern-
ment was acting out of improper motives.").
66. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Medium
Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397, 399 (1998) ("Romer-type scrutiny is
probably better labeled 'rare to medium rare,' or-if we're really being honest
- 'medium-well-to-well-done-but-call-it-rare-to-medium-rare-because-that's-
hipper-and-I-don't-want-to-admit-what-I'm-really-doing' scrutiny."); Mark
Strasser, Equal Protection at the Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits,
and Facial Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935, 940 (2000) (claiming that the Cle-
burne Court "lacked candor" in saying it applied rational basis scrutiny).
[Vol 88:668
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doing so. Therefore, the Court has created something called
"rational basis with bite" in these "quasi-suspect" cases.68 If
Cleburne and Romer were the only teeth-laden equal protection
cases, this criticism might be correct. The sheer number of
these cases, however, and the varied interests at stake in
them,69 suggest that the Court is actually doing what it says:
confronting laws that are so outlandish and attenuated from
legitimate governmental interests that they fail rational basis
scrutiny. There is no thread between the cases suggesting sin-
ister motives. Some involve what might be called "discrete and
insular minorities," 7 but others involve more mundane issues
such as taxation. Admittedly, some tax cases deal with the dif-
ference between in-state and out-of-state residents72 (perhaps
another "quasi-suspect" class), but some merely involve other-
wise similar persons being taxed at differing rates. 73 Neither do
votes of individual justices in these cases provide an explana-
tion, as some are decided unanimously.74 With no available al-
ternative explaining the existence of these opinions, the best
insight to draw is that the rational basis test does indeed exist
as a "test" and that some laws actually are "irrational" and
properly fail that test.
This insight leads the present analysis to a comforting con-
clusion. Because of the sustained interest in rational basis in-
validation, and because the rational basis test is the same for
equal protection and for substantive due process, the Court's
equal protection precedents offer hope for plaintiffs seeking to
67. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis,
85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 308 (1997) (arguing that means scrutiny has perhaps
served as a "guise for assessing ends").
68. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793-96 (1987) ("Since the
Court did not analyze the [Cleburne] ordinance in the same manner that the
dissent did, it must have employed a more exacting form of scrutiny than the
rational basis test.").
69. See supra note 57.
70. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme
Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 411-
15 (1999) (rejecting four possible purposes behind the Court's invalidation of
laws using rational basis scrutiny: (1) helping quasi-suspect classes, (2)
thwarting governmental interests, (3) advancing political agendas, and (4)
creating a new organizing principle for rational basis review).
71. United States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
72. See, e.g., Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 21-27 (1985).
73. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343-
46 (1989).
74. See id.; see also Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 95 (1989).
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protect their economic liberties through the Due Process Clause
and its rational basis test.
II. ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IS ALIVE
AND WELL AND LIVING IN THE LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court has not struck down a law on economic
substantive due process grounds since 1936. 7' This has not been
the case, however, in the lower federal courts.7 ' Although still
by far the exception, courts have increasingly found it in their
power to overturn decisions made by state and local govern-
ments on the grounds that they violate economic substantive
due process.77 In addition to federal courts, state judges have
also begun to recognize the power of economic substantive due
process.7 ' From land use to the zoning of pay phones, state and
federal courts have found some government decisions so trans-
parently unrelated to a legitimate governmental interest thatS • 79
they are unconstitutional. Many of these decisions center on
executive actions, where a governmental official violates a
party's economic liberties, such as in denying a building per-
mit.8 0 Some decisions, however, actually involve a court throw-
75. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936)
(finding a minimum wage law for women unconstitutional), overruled in part
by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 244
(1941).
76. See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due
Process, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 926 (1999).
77. Id. at 918-19.
78. See, e.g., Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P'ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d
101, 107 (Conn. 1994) (invalidating a mandatory Sunday closing law on state
constitutional economic substantive due process grounds); Treants Enters. v.
Onslow County, 350 S.E.2d 365, 370 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he challenged
[licensing] ordinance must fail even the minimal rationality test applicable to
regulations that involve no fundamental rights."), affd, 360 S.E.2d 783, 786
(N.C. 1987).
79. See, e.g., Catanzaro v. Weiden, 140 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated
on reh'g by 188 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 1999); Indep. Coin Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 863 F. Supp. 744, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
80. See, e.g., Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579, 589 (7th Cir. 2001)
(upholding a jury verdict where the town's failure to furnish certificates of
compliance to condominium owners was not "rationally related to a legitimate
government interest"); Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 249-54
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that there was no rational basis for the county to deny
a property owner access to a city street); Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St.
Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1274 (8th Cir. 1994) (remanding for consideration
of a claim that singling out one property holder to pay for a drainage system
was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose); Brady v.
Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing the dis-
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ing out the will of a legislature in favor of the economic liberties
of the individual.81 One example is Santos v. City of Houston,
where city voters banned the use of buses that carry fewer than
fifteen passengers ("jitneys"). 2 The district court found the or-
dinance unconstitutional, citing the allowance of many other
types of commercial passenger vehicles, including taxicabs, mi-
nivans used as taxis, airport buses, and limousines. 3 The court
found no legitimate reason to exclude jitneys while allowing
other vehicles.84 What the court found especially compelling
was the admitted real reason for the ordinance-protection of
the now long defunct streetcar industry.' With no conceivable
legitimate purpose, and with an illegitimate purpose thrust in
its face, the court permanently enjoined the ordinance's en-
forcement.86 Given the number of decisions such as Santos, it is
hard to argue that invalidation of legislation under the rational
basis test is per se illegitimate judicial action. Instead, the en-
forcement of economic substantive due process is a rare, yet
continuously occurring and appropriate judicial method.
Some recent lower court decisions favoring economic sub-
87stantive due process involve occupational licensing. For ex-
ample, in Cornwell v. California Board of Barbering & Cosme-
tology, a federal district court denied a motion to dismiss,
missal of property owner's claim that the town's revocation of a building per-
mit had no rational basis); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1421
(4th Cir. 1983) (finding the denial of a building permit to be motivated "by
manifest arbitrariness and unfairness"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of S. Atl., Inc.
v. Wake County, 905 F. Supp. 312, 321 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that a
county's decision to deny access to a sewer line violated substantive due proc-
ess).
81. See, e.g., Brookpark Entm't, Inc. v. Taft, 951 F.2d 710, 717 (6th Cir.
1991) (declaring unconstitutional a law allowing voters to revoke a liquor li-
cense); Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260,
1273 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (finding no rational basis for requiring African hair styl-
ists to obtain a cosmetology license); Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp.
601, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that an "anti-jitney" ordinance restricting
the availability of small vehicle transportation violated substantive due proc-
ess and equal protection).
82. Santos, 852 F. Supp. at 603.
83. Id. at 608.
84. Id.
85. Id. ("The jitney business was a sacrificial lamb in a deal struck be-
tween City Council and the Houston Electric Company.. .
86. Id. at 609.
87. See, e.g., Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434, 440
(S.D. Miss. 2000) (striking down a casket licensing regulation); see also Brown
v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.D.C. 1989) (invalidating a shoe-shining li-
censing scheme on equal protection grounds).
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holding that the plaintiffs challenge to a cosmetology licensing
requirement, as it was applied to African hair stylists, had
"adequately alleged" a constitutional violation.88 The state
mandated that hair stylists obtain a cosmetology license, which
required 1600 hours of training.89 The court determined that
only four percent of those hours related to the practicing of hair
styling and that the other ninety-six percent were irrelevant to
the trade." Because the licensing requirements were over-
whelmingly irrelevant to the occupation, the court found that
the licensing regime violated substantive due process.9' Other
occupational licensing cases have involved the regulation of
casket sales.92 Currently, ten states limit the selling of caskets
to licensed funeral directors.93 It was such a licensing law at is-
sue in Craigmiles v. Giles.s4
III. CRAIGMILES v. GILES:
ECONOMIC LIBERTY AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Craigmiles concerned the
Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA).95
The FDEA mandates that those engaged in "funeral directing"
be licensed funeral directors.96 Under a 1972 amendment to the
FDEA, the Tennessee legislature expanded the definition of
"[fluneral directing" to include "the selling of funeral merchan-
dise." 7 To become a licensed funeral director, a person must
complete either (1) a year at an accredited mortuary school and
an additional one-year apprenticeship with a licensed funeral
88. Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260,
1273, 1278 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
89. Id.
90. Id. (sixty-five hours out of 1600).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Casket Royale, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 436. But see Powers v.
Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155, at *17-18 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12,
2002) (finding a casket licensing law valid under the rational basis test), ap-
peal docketed, No. 03-6014 (10th Cir. May 23, 2003).
93. Press Release, Inst. for Justice, April Court Arguments Seek to Re-
store America as "Land of Opportunity"; Gov't Limits Sale of Everything from
Wine to Caskets (Apr. 12, 2002), at http://releases.usnewswire.com/
GetRelease.asp?id=118-04122002.
94. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002).
95. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101 (2002).
96. Id. § 62-5-303(b) ("It is unlawful for any person to engage in, or offer to
engage in, either funeral directing, embalming or operation of a funeral estab-
lishment unless such person or business has been duly licensed.").
97. Id. § 62-5-101(6)(A)(ii); Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
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director, or (2) a two-year apprenticeship. After the two years
of training, a candidate must pass the Tennessee Funeral Arts
Exam.99 Although required for the sale of funeral merchandise,
only thirty-seven of the 250 questions on the exam and less
than five percent of the curriculum at the only accredited
school pertain to the selling of such merchandise. 100
Reverend Craigmiles and the other plaintiffs operate inde-
pendent casket stores but are not licensed funeral directors.'
01
They sell various items, including caskets and urns.0 2 Because
the sale of caskets and urns ("funeral merchandise") is included
in Tennessee's definition of "funeral directing," the state told
the plaintiffs to cease and desist their operations. 03 The plain-
tiffs then filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that
the FDEA violated their rights guaranteed under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.0
The Sixth Circuit's opinion did not distinguish between the
due process and equal protection claims.'0 5 Instead, the court
applied the same rational basis standard to both, addressing
them together.06 It began by recognizing that the rational basis
standard is usually easily met. 07 Its only requirement, accord-
ing to Judge Boggs, is "that the regulation bear some rational
98. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222. Only one school, Gupton College, is ap-
proved by the Funeral Board. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 222-23; see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
102. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223.
103. Id.
104. Id. The plaintiffs also claimed the state violated their rights guaran-
teed under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. The court did not reach the merits of this claim. Id. at 229. For more
on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and efforts to overturn the infamous
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), see Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger
Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance
Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 1, 47 (1998).
105. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223-24.
106. See id. In other recent challenges to occupational licensing, courts
have analyzed the economic substantive due process and equal protection
claims separately, even while applying the same rational basis standard to
both. See Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434, 437-41 (S.D.
Miss. 2000); Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp.
1260, 1271-78 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
107. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223-24 (noting that "[elven foolish and misdi-
rected provisions are generally valid").
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relation to a legitimate state interest."1 8 Furthermore, not only
is the burden on the plaintiff to "'negative every conceivable ba-
sis that might support' the regulation,'0 9 but it is "'constitu-
tionally irrelevant [what] reasoning in fact underlay the legis-
lative decision.""'0 Thus, the court found that the state needed
a legitimate state interest that was rationally related to the
regulation, but that the interest did not need to be the actual
reason the legislature had in passing the regulation."'
The state forwarded two justifications for the regulation:
(1) public health and safety, and (2) consumer protection.1 12 The
court found neither rationally related to the licensing require-
ment. 3 In the case of public health and safety, the state prof-
fered that it had an interest in the quality of caskets sold be-
cause if caskets leak, "visitors to funeral services and perhaps
even ground water could be exposed to bacteria emanating from
the corpse."" 4 In response to this claim, the court stated that
there are no requirements under Tennessee law that caskets
meet any standards.1" Loved ones can bury bodies in home-
made caskets and need not use a casket at all.16 The court also
commented that the casket regulation, if anything, made cas-
kets less safe by driving up their cost. 1 7 More market competi-
tion, in the form of more casket sellers, would improve health
and safety, the court said, because the cost of safer caskets
would come down." 8 Because of these facts, the court concluded
that the law was so attenuated from the interest of public
108. Id. at 223 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
109. Id. at 224 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
110. Id. (quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
179 (1980) (citation and quotation omitted)).
111. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) ("[It might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct [a problem]." (emphasis added)).
112. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225.
113. Id. at 228-29 ("None of the justifications offered by the state satisfies
the slight review required by rational basis review under the Due Process and
Equal Protection [Cilauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
114. Id. at 225.
115. Id. (pointing out that the state does not regulate the quality of caskets
themselves).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 226 (noting that given the lack of competition, "nothing prevents
licensed funeral directors from selling shoddy caskets at high prices").
118. Id. ("If casket retailers were to increase competition on casket prices
and bring those prices closer to marginal costs, then more protective caskets
would become more affordable for consumers .... ).
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health and safety that the two were not rationally related. 9
The state argued that its second legitimate governmental
interest, consumer protection, was furthered by holding casket
sellers to the demands of the FDEA, thus "preventing them
from making fraudulent misrepresentations, making solicita-
tions after death or when death is imminent, or selling a previ-
ously used casket."120 The court found this argument unconvinc-
ing. It noted that nonlicensed casket sellers would be held to
some of these demands without the casket regulations through
other civil and criminal consumer protection laws.' 2' The state
also argued licensure under the FDEA provided for application
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) "funeral rule" to all
casket sellers. 22 The funeral rule mandates that funeral service
121providers itemize goods and services provided to consumers.
As a result, when a funeral home bills a customer it must list
what it charges, such as an embalming and a casket, sepa-
rately. Responding to the state's FTC justification, the court
noted that casket retailers only sell caskets, so there was no
need to worry they would bundle charges.
124
The heart of the court's opinion focused on the state's con-
sumer protection justification.' The court recognized that the
FDEA's overinclusiveness might be justified on the grounds of
legislative efficiency.2 6 Rational basis requirements, it said, do
119. Id. (stating that even if casket selection had an effect on public health
and safety, it was not due to a rational relationship between public health and
safety and the FDEA).
120. Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-317(a)(2) (2002)).
121. Id. ("[It is not as if casket retailers would be free to 'engage in misrep-
resentation or fraud' if not covered by the FDEA.").
122. Id. at 227. The funeral rule requires, inter alia, that funeral providers
give customers itemized price lists for funeral services. See Funeral Industry
Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2003).
123. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.2(b)(5). The court thought the rule did not apply to
casket retailers, Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227, but in this it was mistaken. The
definition of "funeral provider" includes anyone who sells "funeral goods." 16
C.F.R. § 453.1(i).
124. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228. Interestingly, in recent litigation chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a similar Oklahoma law, the FTC submitted an
amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs. See Memorandum of Law of Amicus
Curiae The Federal Trade Commission at 14-18, Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-
01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002), appeal docketed, No.
03-6014 (10th Cir. May 23, 2003).
125. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226-27.
126. Id. (noting that "[tihe state could have passed a more nuanced piece of
legislation" but acknowledging that it was perhaps more efficient to demand
all casket sellers be licensed funeral directors).
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not force a legislature into adopting the most narrowly tailored
piece of legislation. 127 Perhaps the legislature did not want to
take the time to exclude non-funeral-home casket sellers from
the licensing regime, and therefore applied the FDEA to all
sellers of caskets. 128 Despite this argument, the court stated
that the specificity of the 1972 amendment to the FDEA sug-
gests that the Tennessee legislature deliberately, and solely,
meant to protect existing funeral directors from competition.
129
The amendment specifically expanded the FDEA's licensing re-
quirements to cover funeral merchandisers. 0 The circuitry of
this legislative behavior, said the court, raised a red flag.'
Further discussing rational basis review, the Sixth Circuit
found that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 32
applied to the legislature's circuitous behavior. 3 3 The Supreme
Court had found that the city had other "better-tailored"134 al-
ternatives to address the purported interest of overcrowding
without barring the mentally retarded. 135 The Tennessee legis-
lation could similarly have addressed the interest of consumer
protection without imposing a prohibitive cost (in this case two
years of training) upon the affected parties. 136
After dispensing with the two legitimate governmental in-
terests advanced by the state, the court identified what it be-
lieved the actual governmental interest to be: protecting fu-
neral directors from competition.17 Just as segregation of the
mentally retarded was the aim of the ordinance in Cleburne,
the 1972 amendment to the FDEA was "very well tailored" to
quashing competition.2 8 This aim, said the court, in and of it-
127. Id. at 227 (recognizing that there is no need for "the best or most
finely honed legislation to be passed").
128. Id.
129. Id. ("This specific action of requiring licensure... appears directed at
protecting licensed funeral directors from retail price competition.").
130. Id.
131. Id. (finding that the pointed nature of the 1972 amendment made the
legislation "suspicious").
132. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
133. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227.
134. Id.
135. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (stating that the city's interest in prevent-
ing overcrowding "fail[s] to explain" why the ordinance had so little effect on
that interest); see also supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
136. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227.
137. Id. at 228 ("The licensure requirement imposes a significant barrier to
competition in the casket market.").
138. Id. ("Finding no rational relationship to any of the articulated pur-
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self, was not a legitimate governmental interest 9 Therefore,
because it found no legitimate governmental interest rationally
related to the FDEA's licensing requirement, and that an ille-
gitimate governmental interest was the real motivator, the
court held that the licensing requirement violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 4 °
IV. A NEW METHOD OF PROTECTING
ECONOMIC LIBERTY
The Sixth Circuit was correct in striking down the FDEA
licensing requirement for funeral merchandise. It was also
correct in applying Cleburne. Since rational basis review un-
der equal protection and economic substantive due process is
virtually identical, 4 1 the Supreme Court's equal protection ra-
tional basis jurisprudence is particularly suited to both the
equal protection and economic substantive due process claims
of Craigmiles, as well as other cases involving economic lib-
erty.144 With the victory for economic liberty in Craigmiles, the
road is now open for further challenges to occupational licens-
ing, thus furthering the dreams of disenfranchised entrepre-
neurs by slicing out irrational regulatory burdens that stand in
their way.
The Craigmiles court did not, however, properly address
the most troubling aspect of the Tennessee licensing require-
ment: its irrelevance to the practice of selling caskets. It missed
an opportunity to demonstrate how absurd the FDEA's re-
quirements truly are. A better analysis would have drawn upon
cases such as Cornwell and emphasized the irrationality of re-
poses of the state, we are left with the more obvious illegitimate purpose to
which [the] licensure provision is very well tailored.").
139. Id. at 224 (stating that "[clourts have repeatedly recognized that pro-
tecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
governmental purpose").
140. Id. at 228-29. The court did not address the two other obvious combi-
nations of these points: a legitimate governmental interest coupled with an
illegitimate governmental interest, and the absence of a legitimate or illegiti-
mate governmental interest. See id. For a discussion of these alternatives, see
infra note 199.
141. This thesis has also been adopted by the Wall Street Journal. See Edi-
torial, Nails in the Coffin, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2003, at A10 (praising the Sixth
Circuit's ruling and labeling the Tennessee law "absurd").
142. See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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quiring occupational training that has nothing to do with one's
occupation. The opinion did properly focus, however, on the dis-
tinction between legitimate and illegitimate governmental in-
terests. This distinction is important, and the court should be
commended for the recognition of how it applies to rational ba-
sis review. The Craigmiles court understood that it is usually
insufficient to invalidate a law under rational basis review by
merely arguing that the law is not rationally related to a le-
gitimate governmental interest. In theory this is all that is re-
quired, but most successful examples of rational basis invalida-
tion, such as Cleburne and Romer v. Evans,1 suggest an
additional step is extremely helpful: showing that the actual
governmental interest served by the law is illegitimate. In Cle-
burne and Romer, the illegitimate interest was animus toward
a group. 46 In Craigmiles, it was sheer economic protection-
ism.14 7 This Comment will illustrate how the Craigmiles court
could have better emphasized the FDEA's irrationality and
how, nevertheless, its opinion can further the efforts of entre-
preneurs outside of the casket retail market.
A. RATIONAL VERSUS IRRATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. The Interest of Public Health and Safety
The Craigmiles court was quite blunt in addressing the
reasons Tennessee offered for its licensing regime: "Tennessee's
justifications for the 1972 amendment come close to striking us
with 'the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.'' 48
The following thought experiment illustrates this point with
regard to the purported health and safety justification. The
problem at issue-the dead body-is never seen by the casket
145. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see supra note 57 (listing cases where stat-
utes failed rational basis review).
146. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
147. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228-29 (6th Cir. 2002).
148. Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 447 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)). The weakness of the public health and safety
defense was apparent in similar litigation against the State of Oklahoma. The
State raised the interest at the start of litigation, but dropped it after its wit-
nesses at trial toughly discredited it. Opening Brief of Appellants at 28-29,
Powers v. Harris, No. 03-6014 (10th Cir. May 23, 2003). Instead, the state
wholly focused on the interest of consumer protection. See Powers v. Harris,
No. CLV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2002).
686 [Vol 88:668
2004] ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
retailer.149 A customer purchases the casket and it is then de-
livered to a funeral home. 5° At the funeral home the body is
treated and placed in the casket. 5' The funeral home is staffed
by licensed funeral directors trained in protecting the public
from the effects of dead bodies.' 5' If an "unsafe casket" were
shipped to the funeral home, the trained and licensed funeral
directors would realize it posed a threat to public health. Fur-
thermore, the concern that untrained casket retailers would
ship "unsafe caskets" is largely illusory.5 3 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, Tennessee does not regulate the quality of caskets or
even require their use."' Casket retailers and funeral homes
sell the same makes of caskets and buy them from the same
distributors. 55 Testimony was taken at trial in Craigmiles that
a leaky casket could pose a threat to public health, 156 but in
practice that threat is nonexistent. In the words of the district
court, "The record contains no evidence that anyone has ever
been harmed by a leaky casket.""7 Caskets are not even meant
to protect health and safety."' The very concept of an "unsafe
casket" is a hollow one.
With this in mind, the licensing requirements of the FDEA
do not further the legitimate governmental interest of public
health and safety. That is, they do not further the interest ra-
tionally. A legislator might come to the opposite conclusion if
she did not, for example, consider how caskets actually work
149. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 225.
152. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-201 (2002) (mandating that those who
engage in the treatment of bodies be licensed funeral directors).
153. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225-26 (finding "no evidence in the record
that licensed funeral directors were selling caskets that were systematically
more protective than those sold by independent casket retailers").
154. Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) ("Cus-
tomers can choose any casket they desire, snug or airy, despite the views of
the funeral director and regardless of the cause of the deceased's death."),
affd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
155. See id. at 663 (noting that caskets do not differ between those sold in-
dependently and those sold by funeral directors).
156. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225 ("[Fluneral directors testified that such
leakage was of particular concern when the decedent died from a communica-
ble disease, or when the body was not embalmed.").
157. Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
158. See id. ("In those rare instances where human remains (before burial)
might present a public health concern, funeral directors do not rely on caskets
to negate the threat. Instead, they rely on embalming, adjustments to the fu-
neral arrangements, and other techniques . ").
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(that is, that they are pieces of wood placed in a hole in the
ground). If she ignored these pieces of evidence, she might con-
clude that a two-year licensing regime designed for funeral di-
rectors should be applied to casket retailers. In doing so, how-
ever, she would be thinking irrationally. The licensing
requirement would then be irrationally related to the interest
of public health and safety. Thinking irrationally does not, of
course, satisfy rational basis review.15 9 Therefore, even though
someone might think the licensing requirement was rationally
related to the interest of public health and safety, it would, in
fact, not be. This analysis may appear overly pedantic, but be-
cause of the rational basis test being what it is, such appeals to
the blatantly obvious become necessary.
2. The Interest of Consumer Protection
The other purported legitimate governmental interest, con-
sumer protection, is slightly more complicated. 6 ° Although
some mandates of the FDEA parallel general consumer protec-
tion laws that apply to all businesses, other mandates, such as
selling a previously used casket, do not directly apply to unli-
censed casket retailers.1 6' The Sixth Circuit stated that the leg-
islature could easily rectify this inadequacy by applying the leg-
islation to retailers, but, as it also correctly pointed out, under
rational basis review, legislation does not need to be narrowly
tailored.162 The Tennessee Funeral Board has the power to rep-
rimand funeral directors who violate the FDEA. Therefore,
Tennessee believed it had a valid argument that unlicensed
casket retailers would thwart this protective instrument.
63
The district court pointed out that in its entire history the
Funeral Board had never reprimanded a funeral director in
connection with the sale of funeral merchandise.1 64 Nonetheless,
the Funeral Board's disciplinary power appears in the abstract
to be a rational way for the Tennessee legislature to protect the
159. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 470 U.S. 451, 476-77 (1985) (stating that legislation violates economic
substantive due process if it is "irrational").
160. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 226-28.
161. See id. at 226 (admitting that some requirements of the FDEA do not
otherwise apply to unlicensed casket retailers).
162. See id. at 227.
163. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-317 (2003) (giving the Board the ability
to suspend or terminate funeral director licenses).
164. Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd,
312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
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consumer. If the FDEA required only a week of consumer train-
ing or some other mild licensing requirement in order to sell
funeral merchandise, the requirement might be eminently rea-
sonable. Instead, the legislature imposed a two-year training
requirement, featuring a curriculum largely irrelevant to cas-
ket retailing.
165
It is upon this point, the specifics of the training require-
ment, that the court should have relied to a much greater de-
gree. It should have contrasted the FDEA with the regulations
at issue in Williamson. There, the Supreme Court addressed
the rational basis for requiring a prescription to fit lenses. 6 '
The arguments proffered for the law's rational basis were that
some customers had such specific needs that a universal pre-
scription requirement would be beneficial, and that the public
should be encouraged to get repeated eye examinations.167
These arguments may appear specious, but they do, at least
conceivably, further the legitimate governmental interest of
public health.
The regulations involved in Craigmiles are of a different
order. The FDEA requires retailers who sell caskets and urns
to spend two years learning about the entire funeral directing
business."' If prospective casket sellers take the option requir-
ing a year of school, they must pay between $10,000 and
$12,000 in tuition and expenses while spending no more than
five percent of their time learning about issues pertinent to
selling caskets and urns.9 Once finished with their training
they must pass a test where only thirty-seven questions out of
250 pertain to selling caskets and urns. 70 Thus, businesspeople
who want to sell caskets and urns and who want nothing to do
with arranging funerals or embalming bodies must endure two
years of study largely consisting of funeral preparation and
embalming. The FDEA effectively bars the practice of inde-
pendent casket selling, as anyone with years of funeral direct-
ing experience and $10,000 in educational investments would,
presumably, rather go into the business for which they had just
165. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
166. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955);
supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
167. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
168. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002).
169. See id.; Craigmiles, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (stating that those figures
apply to the "more popular" sixteen-month option).
170. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
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trained. In Williamson, opticians could still fit lenses; they just
needed their clients to obtain a prescription. 7' This require-
ment may have been an unjust imposition on opticians, but at
least it still allowed the opticians to go about their business.
The FDEA requirements, on the other hand, eviscerate the
non-funeral-director casket retail market. This evisceration
may appear a very small loss to the totality of entrepreneurs
and the people they employ, but when coupled with the many
other occupations heavily encumbered by licensing laws, the
sabotage of human potential grows to much greater propor-
tions .
Since only five percent of Tennessee's training time con-
cerns the sale of caskets,' ninety-five percent of that time is
irrelevant to the occupation casket retailers wish to pursue. A
similar situation presented itself in Cornwell v. California
Board of Barbering & Cosmetology.'74 There, the court found
that a cosmetology licensing requirement, as it applied to Afri-
can hair styling, violated economic substantive due process be-
cause only four percent of the required training hours per-
tained to hair styling.7 5 In addition, those hours did not
specifically pertain to hair styling, and could have been as justi-
fiably required of any occupation, because they would have
been just as useful. 76 Taken together, that the training hours
(1) were irrelevant to the sought-after occupation and (2) com-
prised the overwhelming majority of the licensing require-
ments, suggested that the state was placing irrational demands
on prospective hair stylists. 177 The Craigmiles court should have
applied the same reasoning to Tennessee's regime, and should
have stated that requiring prospective workers to go through a
training regime in which ninety-five percent of the training is
irrelevant to their occupation is so extreme that it is irrational.
This is not to say that there is a mathematical formula with a
bright line dividing a "rational" percentage from an "irrational"
171. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 486 ("The effect of [the statute] is to forbid the
optician from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription. .. .
172. See infra notes 203-16 and accompanying text.
173. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
174. 962 F. Supp. 1260, 1273 (S.D. Cal. 1997); see supra notes 88-91 and
accompanying text.
175. Cornwell, 962 F. Supp. at 1273.
176. Id. (remarking that it would be just as appropriate, and just as irra-
tional, to send "food preparers" to cosmetology school as it would be to send
hair stylists).
177. See id.
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percentage. Regulations do reach a point, however, where they
are so attenuated from furthering their purported purposes
that legislators could not think them rationally related to those
178purposes.
This failure of the Craigmiles court to emphasize the ir-
relevance of the licensing standards pertains to criticism ofr • 179
Craigmiles in Powers v. Harris. In that case, decided six days• .7 180
after the Sixth Circuit decided Craigmiles, Oklahoma casket
retailers challenged a law very similar to Tennessee's." The
district judge critiqued Craigmiles, stating that the Sixth Cir-
cuit used policy arguments in striking down the licensing re-. . 182
strictions. Policy arguments are not allowed under the ra-
tional basis test, argued the court, so the Sixth Circuit went
beyond its authority in weighing the pros and cons of licensing
versus increased competition in the casket market.8 3 The criti-
cal analytical flaw in the Powers opinion, however, is that the
Supreme Court does exactly that-evaluates policy argu-
ments-when it subjects legislation to the rational basis test.18 4
It is just that the policy argument must demonstrate that the
legislation is irrational. Without the method of Cornwell, the
Craigmiles court left itself open to this criticism. If it had pur-
sued the irrelevancy question further, courts such as the one
deciding Powers would see the irrationality of the legislation
much more starkly. As it is, Craigmiles has a certain air of the
Lochner Court, with policy justifications not quite unmasking
the irrationality of the FDEA18 5 Of course, the Powers court
178. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156, 2160
(2003) (stating that a court must provide a "plausible basis on which the legis-
lature may have relied" to uphold challenged legislation (emphasis added)).
179. Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 12, 2002).
180. Id. at *14.
181. Id.
182. Id. at*15.
183. Id. (stating that the Craigmiles court "engages in balancing of the
various public policies which it finds to be either served or not served by the
Tennessee law").
184. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that even under
modern economic substantive due process jurisprudence the Supreme Court
uses means-ends analysis).
185. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002) (argu-
ing that the legislature might have better confronted "bundling" by funeral
homes by allowing casket retailers to not be licensed). If the Craigmiles court
had left out its policy arguments and just stuck to the irrationality of the li-
censing law, the Powers court might have looked more kindly upon it. How-
ever, the policy arguments illuminate the absurdities of the legislation by
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could simply believe that economic legislation cannot fail the
rational basis test, period. This holding would follow Ferguson
v. Skrupa,9 6 however, and not Williamson.187 As seen earlier,
the Ferguson approach has not been the prevailing standard in
the courts.8 8
Even though the Craigmiles court failed to properly apply
an irrelevancy criterion, the strong specter of an illegitimate
governmental interest remained.8 9 The 1972 FDEA amend-
ment illustrates that the Tennessee legislature acted solely to
prevent competition in the casket market.' 90 Therefore, the
amendment was supported by an illegitimate governmental in-
terest.' 9 ' With no legitimate governmental interests supporting
it in the first place, precedent calls for striking down the law.
92
B. How EQUAL PROTECTION RATIONAL BASIS CAN FURTHER
ECONOMIC LIBERTY
As just alluded to, the demands of rational basis review are
not impossible to overcome, but they are extraordinarily high.
9 3
If a court finds all proffered arguments not rationally related to
a legitimate governmental interest, the possibility remains that
there might be others yet unconsidered. As said above, how-
ever, what can tip the scales is plain evidence that an illegiti-
mate interest is at work.' Some might argue, of course, that
plain evidence was at hand in economic substantive due proc-
ess cases like Williamson, demonstrating that the law in ques-
tion clearly was protectionist. 9' Indeed, the evidence was
rather plain in Williamson, but the proffered arguments con-
pointing out, for example, how other options existed for the legislature to ad-
dress the evil of bundling casket prices with other funeral costs.
186. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
187. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955).
188. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text; supra Part II.
189. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing heightened
suspicion once illegitimate governmental interests arise).
190. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (explaining how all
possible rational basis arguments must first be defeated).
194. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (arguing that the
harm stemming from the bar against antidiscrimination laws "outrun[s] and
belie[s] any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it").
195. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955)
(admitting that the law may generally be "needless" and "wasteful").
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necting the law in question with legitimate governmental in-
terests satisfied rational basis review. 196 In contrast, equal pro-
tection cases like Cleburne, Romer, and Moreno"s7 contained
evidence of illegitimate interests coupled with the absence of a
legitimate interest.'98 This two-step process provides a method
of overcoming the demands of rational basis review. 199
There is little reason why courts should not extend this
method to Craigmiles and to other economic substantive due
process challenges to occupational licensing. The Craigmiles
court applied Cleburne to equal protection and due process be-
cause it found rational basis review to be the same under
both. 00 To argue that Cleburne and similar equal protection
cases apply only to equal protection and not to substantive due
process implies that the levels of rational basis review are dif-
ferent. They are not, as seen earlier, and so a cross application
is acceptable. 01 Courts are therefore free to learn from the ex-
ample of Craigmiles and protect entrepreneurs from the ex-
cesses of occupational licensing.
196. See supra notes 166-67, 171 and accompanying text.
197. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(overturning a denial of food stamp benefits); see also supra note 57.
198. For example, in Moreno the Court found no legitimate interest in de-
nying food stamp benefits to households composed of unrelated people. 413
U.S. at 538. The government argued such households led to more abuse of the
program. Id. at 534. The Court responded by stating this argument was based
on "wholly unsubstantiated assumptions" contrary to the evidence. Id. In-
stead, the Court found that the illegitimate interest of discouraging "hippies'"
and "'hippie communes' prompted the denial of benefits. Id. at 537 (quotation
omitted). Thus, the Court found a lack of a legitimate interest and the pres-
ence of an illegitimate interest.
199. Two other combinations of interests-a law justified by both a legiti-
mate governmental interest and an illegitimate governmental interest, or a
law justified by neither a legitimate nor illegitimate governmental interest-
probably meet rational basis requirements. The first scenario is the situation
present in Williamson, and therefore meets rational basis. See Williamson,
348 U.S. at 487. The second scenario leaves a judge wondering whether a ra-
tional argument exists of which she has not thought. This is not to say a stat-
ute will necessarily survive the second scenario. The second scenario arguably
existed in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336,
343-46 (1989), where the Court struck down a taxation scheme even though it
identified no legitimate interest and did not speculate on an illegitimate inter-
est.
200. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 223-25, 227 (6th Cir. 2002).
201. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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C. WHY ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Is GOOD POLICY
Whatever the state of the law may be, an outstanding issue
remains: whether economic substantive due process itself is a
wise policy. Perhaps if the Supreme Court is faced with a law
that actually fails the due process rational basis test it should
stamp out the doctrine entirely, giving even irrational legisla-
tion a pass. °2 There are reasons, however, that it would want to
refrain from doing so and keep the doctrine alive. Take an en-
trepreneur like Reverend Nathaniel Craigmiles. He wants to
sell caskets and does so at lower prices than funeral homes.0 3
There are no indications that his lack of formal training nega-
tively affects the public.204 Removing the licensing barrier from
a business like his helps his customers and his local economy
by spurring innovation and competition. 205 The same is true for
other kinds of economic barriers, but especially true for other
forms of occupational 20
In many fields of regulation, but particularly in occupa-
tional licensing, governments often impose requirements sim-
ply to protect entrenched economic interests. 20 ' These regula-
tions hamper the creation of jobs and wealth. 2 " Reform of
anticompetitive licensing requirements through the legislative
process is exceedingly hard to accomplish.209 Despite the detri-
mental effects of occupational licensing upon consumers and
202. The Court did this in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
Since then, however, it has repeatedly stated the need for a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental interest. See supra notes 40-48 and accom-
panying text.
203. Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (stat-
ing that funeral homes mark up prices between 250% and 600%, while Rever-
end Craigmiles adds a flat $350 and a co-plaintiff applies a 100% increase),
affd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
204. See supra Part IV.A.
205. See S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING IN AMERICA 71-73 (1987) (detailing how licensing laws tend to sti-
fle innovation by encouraging anticompetitive practices).
206. See id. at 1 ("Occupational regulation has served to limit consumer
choice, raise consumer costs, increase practitioner income, limit practitioner
mobility, deprive the poor of adequate services, and restrict job opportunities
for minorities ... ").
207. Id. at 24-25.
208. See MARY J. RUWART, HEALING OUR WORLD: THE OTHER PIECE OF
THE PUZZLE 45-46 (1993) (describing how daycare requirements prevent poor
mothers from opening daycares while also raising the price of the service they
hope to provide).
209. YOUNG, supra note 205, at 27-28.
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the poor and arguably upon quality, licensing reform is a pains-
taking process that yields few results."' Because the benefits of
licensing are heavily concentrated in current practitioners and
the liabilities are dispersed among potential new practitioners
and consumers, those currently licensed have a much stronger
incentive to lobby for licensing restrictions than potential prac-
titioners and consumers have to lobby against them. 1' Because
of this, legislatures rarely deregulate licensing regimes.212 At
the same time, various sectors of society, especially minori-
213 214 relzties and the poor, cannot realize their full potential because
of licensing requirements such as those in the FDEA. With em-
bedded regulatory schemes before them, they must resort to the
courts and to economic substantive due process in order to pro-
tect their right to earn a living.
This is not to say that courts should shred licensing stat-
utes at will. Some occupational licensing is unquestionably ra-
tionally related to protecting the public. Few people would want
unlicensed heart surgeons or nuclear engineers. When it comes
to licensing exceedingly less dangerous occupations such as
ushers and hair stylists, however, the benefits to the public be-
come much more suspect.215 Using economic substantive due
process to open up restricted markets such as mass transit
could provide, and has provided, increased economic opportu-
nity and consumer choice.16
Even if workers and consumers would benefit from in-
creased use of the doctrine, some worry that such an increase
would signal a move back to the activism of the Lochner era.2 17
Rational basis deference, it is argued, may be hard to hold onto
if courts begin to throw out more and more economic regula-
210. See Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
2000, at 194.
211. See YOUNG, supra note 205, at 26-27.
212. See Kleiner, supra note 210, at 194.
213. See David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the
Use of Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1994) (noting how licensing laws restricted blacks
from working in the post-Civil War South).
214. RUWART, supra note 208, at 43-44.
215. See Doug Bandow, Killing Enterprise in New York, CATO INST. DAILY
COMMENT., Apr. 16, 1997, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/4-16-97.html.
216. See Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(finding an "anti-jitney" ordinance restricting the availability of small vehicle
transportation violated economic substantive due process and equal protec-
tion).
217. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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tions.218 On the other hand, some argue a "regression" to
Lochner-era jurisprudence would be a good idea, breaking down
seemingly rational yet unwise and counterproductive regula-
tions. 2' 9 The merits of such a move are best left to another
study.220 Fears that a more active use of rational basis review
would open up haphazard denials of legislative power, however,
are likely unfounded. The Supreme Court has repeatedly re-
served a narrow area within which legislation violates eco-
nomic substantive due process. 221 To expand that area would
require elevating economic liberties to the status of "fundamen-
tal liberties," which are currently granted strict scrutiny.222
This would require more than a slippery slope toward an activ-
ist rational basis jurisprudence. It would demand a seismic
shift in precedent not seen since 1938.223 Such a scenario is ex-
tremely unlikely given the modern Court's aversion to interfer-
ing with the power of the legislature. 24 Working within the ra-
tional basis test to further economic liberty, on the other hand,
is a method the Court still allows for and has indirectly
strengthened through its equal protection rulings. 25
CONCLUSION
In Craigmiles v. Giles, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled Tennessee's Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act vio-
218. See 6th Circuit Buries Protectionist Statute in Tennessee Case, TECH.
L.J., Dec. 6, 2002 (claiming that the Sixth Circuit sidestepped the rational ba-
sis test and instead applied heightened scrutiny), at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2002/20021206.asp.
219. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 318-22 (1980); Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doc-
trine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1382-83
(1990).
220. See, e.g., SIEGAN, supra note 219, at 318-22 (arguing strongly in favor
of higher-level scrutiny for economic liberties); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic
Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, in 1962
SuP. CT. REV. 34, 62 (1962) (urging courts to refrain from using the doctrine);
Phillips, supra note 76, at 965 (counseling for limited use).
221. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
222. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (stating that if an
interest is not "fundamental," it only receives rational basis review).
223. See United States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(bifurcating the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment into those where
the legislature is given deference, and those which call for higher judicial scru-
tiny).
224. See supra Part L.A (explaining the lenient method of the modern
Court's review of economic regulation).
225. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
[Vol 88:668
2004] ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 697
lated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses. Even though the court applied rational basis
review, it invalidated the law by holding that it furthered no
legitimate governmental interest and instead furthered the il-
legitimate interest of economic protectionism. Craigmiles is the
latest in a line of lower court decisions recognizing the contin-
ued viability of economic substantive due process. More signifi-
cantly, it is the first circuit court decision invalidating an occu-
pational licensing law by using the doctrine since the New
Deal. It is a wake-up call to all sides that economic substantive
due process is not dead, and that, as Mark Twain might say,
the rumors of its demise have been greatly exaggerated.
The court correctly found the Supreme Court's equal pro-
tection rational basis precedent controlling. Courts should re-
peat this application in challenges to other economic regula-
tions, especially those restricting the right to earn a living.
Judicial intervention into economic affairs may conjure up fears
of a return of the Lochner era, but limited use of economic sub-
stantive due process under rational basis review will extend
needed protection against egregious violations of economic lib-
erties. It will also result in greater opportunities for entrepre-
neurs who otherwise cannot pursue the occupation of their call-
ing.
